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NORTH DAKOTA

William Black ∗

I. Introduction
Multiple oil and gas related issues have been addressed over the past
year. This article will summarize and discuss various case law, legislative,
and regulatory developments related to the oil and gas industry in North
Dakota from August 1, 2015 to July 1, 2016.
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments
The North Dakota Legislature did not have a regular session in 2016.
Therefore, it did not enact any new oil and gas legislation.
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A. November Ballot
The North Dakota electorate will decide on a proposed constitutional
amendment in the November election. The proposed amendment changes
how a certain percentage of the revenue from oil extraction taxes from
taxable oil produced in North Dakota will be allocated and distributed. The
measure is intended to expand the educational purpose for which the
foundation aid stabilization fund may be used.
B. North Dakota Industrial Commission, Department of Mineral Resources,
Oil and Gas Division
On June 29, 2016, the North Dakota Industrial Commission, Department
of Mineral Resources, Oil and Gas Division (“Commission”) approved
additions and amendments to the North Dakota Administrative Code
Chapters 43-02-03, 43-02-05, and 43-02-08, which address new
requirements for the oil and gas industry in areas such as saltwater handling
facilities, underground gathering pipelines, and spill containment. 1 Outlined
below are some of amendments instituted by the Commission.
The Commission instituted new regulations concerning underground
gathering pipelines. 2 These regulations included new notice and inspection
requirements for underground gathering pipelines, as well as new bonding
requirements for crude oil and produced water underground gathering
pipelines. 3 The Commission also amended and expanded regulations
concerning the design, construction, operation, maintenance and
abandonment of underground gathering pipelines.4
The Commission also included new permitting and bonding
requirements for new and existing saltwater handling facilities.5
Additionally, the Commission promulgated a variety of new regulations and
requirements regarding the construction, operation, abandonment and
reclamation of such facilities.6 The Commission further established new
requirements for construction of perimeter berms to provide emergency
containment around saltwater handling facilities, storage facilities and
production sites, and treatment plants.7
1. NORTH DAKOTA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/ (last
visited September 23, 2016).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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The Commission’s website contains a complete description of these new
policies. 8 The tentative effective date for these rules is October 1, 2016.9
III. Judicial Developments
A. The Supreme Court of North Dakota
1. No Private Right of Action for Damages Under N.D.C.C. § 38-0806.4: Vogel v. Marathon Oil Co.
N.D.C.C. § 38-08-06.4 restricts the flaring of gas produced with crude oil
from an oil well and provides that a “producer shall pay royalties to royalty
owners upon the value of the gas flared” for wells operated in violation of
the statute. 10 In Vogel v. Marathon Oil Co., the Supreme Court of North
Dakota addressed whether there is an implied right of action for damages
under the statute.11 Sarah Vogel, a royalty owner, sued Marathon Oil
Company alleging that Marathon flared gas in violation of the statute and
failed to pay royalties on the value of the flared gas. 12 Vogel sought
declaratory relief and money damages under N.D.C.C. § 38-08-06.4 and the
Environmental Law Enforcement Act (“ELEA”).13 She also sought
damages under common law for conversion and waste. 14 The district court
dismissed the complaint without prejudice finding that N.D.C.C. § 38-0806.4 does not provide an expressed or implied private right of action and
further concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because
Vogel did not exhaust her administrative remedies. 15 Vogel appealed the
district court judgment. 16
Upon review, the Court noted that N.D.C.C. § 38-08-06.4 does not
expressly provide for a private right of action.17 Vogel argued, however,
that a private right of action was implied in the statute. 18 After a review of
statutory language and legislative intent, the Court found there is not an
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 879 N.W.2d 471, 476 (N.D. 2016) (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-08-06.4(4)
(West 2016)).
11. Id. at 474.
12. Id. at 474-75.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 475.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 476.
18. Id.
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implied private right of action for violation of the statute.19 Instead, the
statute contains a comprehensive regulatory scheme that provides an
administrative remedy to royalty owners for a violation of N.D.C.C. § 3808-06.4. 20
The Court then addressed Vogel’s claim that the ELEA provided a
private right of action to enforce N.D.C.C. § 38-08-06.4. 21 The ELEA
authorizes a private right of action for any person aggrieved by the violation
of any environmental statute. 22 While the Court agreed that the N.D.C.C. §
38-08-06.4 is an environmental statute as defined by the ELEA, it noted
that any remedies provided by the ELEA “are cumulative and do not
replace statutory or common law.” 23 The Court held that the administrative
remedies available under N.D.C.C. ch. 38-08 must be pursued “before an
‘aggrieved person’ may bring a private action under the ELEA,” which
provides a cumulative remedy that may be pursued if the Commission fails
or refuses to act. 24 Therefore, “Vogel [was] required to exhaust her
administrative remedies prior to pursuing any claims she may have in
court.” 25
The Court further addressed Vogel’s common law claims of conversion
and waste for damages for unpaid royalties on the flared gas.26 The Court
discussed that N.D.C.C. § 38-08-06.4 regulates the flaring of gas from oil
wells, gives royalty owners the right to receive royalties on gas flared in
violation of the statute, and provides a remedy for the royalty owner when
the statute is violated, “replacing common law claims for royalties on flared
gas.” 27 The Court then found that the statute is designed to cover the entire
field relating to royalties for flared gas and as a result N.D.C.C. § 38-0806.4 governs any claim for royalties for flared gas. 28 Therefore, the district
court did not err in dismissing Vogel’s common law claims. 29
CONCURRING OPINION: Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a separate
opinion concurring in result but outlining concerns with the precedent that

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 477.
Id. at 477-78.
Id. at 480.
Id.
Id. at 480-81.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 482-83.
Id. at 482.
Id.
Id. at 483.
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may be established if the majority’s opinion is read too broadly. 30 The
concurring opinion discussed concerns regarding potential interference with
the contractual relationship between the lessor and the lessee and the rights
of the lessor under the lease. 31 Further the concurring opinion expressed
concern the decision “will be cited as the basis for the position that
N.D.C.C. § 38-08-06.4(5) is the exclusive remedy for lessors or, at the very
least, the portal through which all lessors must pass before being allowed to
bring a private cause of action against the lessee for royalties for flared gas
under their leases,” and indicated the opinion should not be cited as such.32
DISSENTING OPINION: Justice Kapsner wrote a detailed dissenting
opinion regarding the majority’s finding that the royalty owner was
required to exhaust her administrative remedies before she could bring a
private action under the ELEA. 33 The dissenting opinion argued that the
“majority ignored the straightforward legal concept” of a “cumulative
remedy” and confused the nature of such remedies.34 The dissent further
asserted that, by requiring an aggrieved person to first exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing an action under the ELEA, the
majority’s holding “eviscerates the ELEA” and effectively removed the
private enforcement power it was meant to provide. 35 In doing so, the
majority disregarded the plain language of the ELEA and frustrated its
purpose. 36 The dissent also argued that the majority’s holding was
inconsistent with other jurisdictions’ treatment of similar legislation. 37
Noting that prior to the majority’s opinion, the Court had not yet interpreted
North Dakota’s ELEA. 38 The dissenting opinion maintained that “[t]he
majority’s inaugural interpretation here strips the statute of the very purpose
the legislature expressed for its enactment” and disregards the very reason it
was adopted. 39

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 486-91.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 486.
Id.
Id. at 486-89.
Id.
Id. at 489-90.
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2. Royalty Interests Cannot Not Be Considered Abandoned if Related
Mineral Interests are In Use: Yesel v. Brandon.
In Yesel v. Brandon, 40 surface owners, Phyllis Yesel and Gloria Van
Dyke, brought an action to quiet title against nonparticipating royalty
interest owners alleging the abandoned mineral statutes found in N.D.C.C.
ch. 38-18.1 applied to the royalty interests and that the minerals in fact had
been abandoned. 41 Under N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-02, any mineral interest
unused for a period of twenty years immediately preceding the first
publication of the notice is deemed to be abandoned.42 Title to the
abandoned mineral interest then vests in the owners of the surface estate. 43
The district court granted summary judgment for the royalty owners
holding that the abandoned mineral statutes did not apply to royalty
interests and even if they did, the royalty interest was used in the previous
twenty years. 44 The surface owners then appealed. 45 Christian Teigen, an
heir to the named royalty owners, cross appealed from a judgment denying
his motion to file a counterclaim and his motion for attorneys’ fees. 46
On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the royalty interests were
used during the previous twenty years and thus found it unnecessary to
address the issue of whether the abandoned mineral statutes apply to royalty
interests. 47 Since the mineral interests related to the defendants’ royalty
interests were covered by numerous leases, were subject to a pooling order,
and were producing oil from at least two wells, it was undisputed that the
mineral interests were used within the twenty-year period prior to the notice
of lapse. 48 Given that a royalty interest owner cannot develop or produce
the related mineral interest but can only receive a share of the proceeds of
production mineral, the Court held that “a royalty interest cannot be
considered abandoned if the related mineral interest is being used under
N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-03(1)” 49 and affirmed summary judgment in favor the
royalty owners. 50
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

867 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 2015).
Id. at 679.
Id. at 681.
Id.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 679.
Id.
Id. at 680–81.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id. at 685.
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Regarding the issues raised on cross appeal, the Court found that the
district court abused its discretion and misapplied the law regarding
compulsory counterclaims when it denied the motion to file the
counterclaim and remanded for reconsideration of that motion.51 As to the
motion for attorneys’ fees, however, the Court concluded the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion.52
3. Meaning of “Production” and an Approach for Determining
“Production in Paying Quantities” Addressed: Fleck v. Missouri River
Royalty Corp.
In Fleck v. Missouri River Royalty Corp., 53 the Supreme Court of North
Dakota concluded that the district court, in finding that production in
paying quantities was not required to extend a lease, misapplied the law in
its interpretation of the lease. 54 The lease at issue was executed in 1972.55
The term of the lease was for ten years and “as long thereafter as oil or gas,
or either of them, is produced from said land by the lessee, its successors
and assigns.” 56 The lease also contained a savings clause which provided
that if production ceased after the expiration of the primary term, the lease
would not expire if, within ninety days of cessation, the lessee resumed
operations to drill a well or to restore production.57 In 1982, a well was
completed on the property thereby extending the lease.58 In 2012, Nathaniel
Fleck and Alma Bergmann, as trustees of the George J. Fleck Trust
(collectively “Fleck”), owner of the mineral interest covered by the lease,
brought an action to quiet title, alleging that the well stopped producing in
paying quantities in 2010, and the lease had therefore expired.59
The district court declared that the lease was valid and granted summary
judgment in favor of the lessees. 60 The district court, in concluding that the
lease remained in full force and effect at all times, found that the well
produced a few barrels per day on average, any temporary cessation of
production was timely restored, and production in paying quantities was not

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
872 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 2015).
Id. at 331.
Id.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 331.
Id.
Id.
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necessary to extend the lease. 61 Fleck appealed the district court’s
findings. 62
On appeal, the Court examined the definition of the term “production,”
as it was not specifically defined in the lease.63 Noting that technical words
are to be interpreted as they would be by persons working in the related
profession, the Court found that, in absence of a definition, the term
“production” is “generally interpreted to mean ‘production in paying
quantities’” when the term is used in a “so long thereafter” clause in an oil
and gas lease. 64 The Court further noted that this interpretation has
generally been adopted because the objective of a lease is to obtain
production of oil or gas in quantities that are commercially profitable to
both parties, and parties generally do not intend for the lease to be held for
speculative purposes only. 65 Therefore, the Court held that in this case, the
term “production” as used in the habendum clause meant “production in
paying quantities.” 66 In addition, the Court looked at the savings clause of
the lease and held that “production” as used in the savings clause must also
be interpreted as “production in paying quantities” for the same reasons.67
After reviewing past decisions and approaches used in other
jurisdictions, the court agreed with the rationale used by Texas and other
courts, holding that “[a] court must consider whether the well yielded a
profit over operating costs over a reasonable period of time and whether a
reasonable and prudent operator would continue to operate a well in the
manner in which the well was operated under the relevant facts and
circumstances.” 68 Finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed
regarding whether the well was producing in paying quantities, the Court
reversed and remanded the case.69
4. Specific “No Deductions” Language Prevails Over General “Market
Value at the Well” Provision: Kittleson v. Grynberg Petroleum Co.
In Kittleson v. Grynberg Petroleum Co., 70 the Supreme Court of North
Dakota affirmed that the meaning of “market value at the well” can be
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 333.
Id. (quoting Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 848 N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 2014)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 336.
876 N.W.2d 443 (N.D. 2016).
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contractually modified. 71 In 1991, Grynberg Petroleum Company
(collectively with its successors in interest “Grynberg” or “Lessee”) and
Tyronne and Marilyn Kittleson (“Lessor”) entered into an oil and gas lease
and executed a separate rider that modified and amended the lease. 72 The
royalty clause in the lease specified that the Lessor was be to paid the
market value at the well for all gas produced and sold by the Lessee from
the leased premise, “provided however, that there shall be no deductions
from the value of Lessor's royalty of any required processing, cost of
dehydration, compression, transportation, or other matter to market such
gas.” 73 The gas produced was a sour gas and had to be processed to be
made marketable. 74 After the sale of the gas and liquids, Grynberg
calculated the Lessor’s royalty payment by deducting post-production costs
using “the work-back method.” 75 A suit was filed claiming that postproduction costs were wrongfully deducted because the language contained
in the royalty clause prohibited such deductions.76 After a bench trial, the
district court determined that, based on terms in the royalty clause,
Grynberg was not allowed to deduct processing costs from the royalties
paid to the Lessor.77 Applying the ten-year statute of limitations, the district
court entered a judgment awarding underpaid royalties, interest on the
underpaid royalties, and attorney’s fees. 78
On appeal, Grynberg argued that the Court’s holding in Bice v. PetroHunt, LLC 79 controlled and allowed it to deduct post-production costs from
the royalty payments. 80 In its interpretation of the “market value at well,”
the Court in Bice adopted the “at the well rule,” which allows a lessee to
use the work-back method to calculate the gas or oil market value at the
well and to deduct post-production costs from its proceeds before
calculating royalty. 81 The Court rejected Grynberg’s argument, noting that
facts in the present case were distinguishable from Bice. 82 While the royalty
clauses in both cases required the Lessor to be paid the market value at the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 450.
Id. at 445.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 446.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 768 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 2015)).
Kittleson, 876 N.W.2d at 447.
Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 447.
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well for all gas produced from the leased premise, here the lease contained
additional “no deduction” language that was not included in the lease in
Bice. 83 Noting that the “market value at the well” and the “no deductions”
terms in present lease conflict, the Court held that the more specific “no
deduction” language controlled. 84 Therefore, the Court concluded that
under the “no deductions” language of the royalty clause, Grynberg could
not deduct post-production costs. 85
5. Court Interprets the Interests Conveyed in Multiple Deeds to
Railroad: EOG Resources Inc. v. Soo Line Railroad Co.
In EOG Resources Inc. v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 86 the Supreme Court of
North Dakota interpreted whether deeds granting interests to a railroad
company conveyed a fee simple interest or an easement.87 EOG Resources,
Inc. (“EOG”) brought an action to quiet title claiming that Soo Line
Railroad had no interest in the minerals in and under the disputed
property. 88 In dispute were sixteen parcels of land acquired by Soo Line
through seven deeds, a condemnation order, and an Act of Congress. 89 The
parties stipulated that the Act of Congress only granted an easement.90 The
district court granted EOG’s motion for summary judgment finding that
Soo Line only had an easement across the disputed properties.91 Soo Line
Railroad appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that
the seven deeds conveyed only an easement. 92 Soo Line Railroad did not
appeal the district court’s finding regarding the condemnation order. 93
On appeal, in support of the finding for summary judgment, EOG relied
on Lalim v. Williams County, 94 where the Court had previously determined
that a deed to the county road system only conveyed an easement. 95
However, in its review, the Court distinguished Lalim by finding that the
deed in Lalim was from a private party to the government, whereas in the
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
867 N.W.2d 308 (N.D. 2015).
Id. at 310.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 312.
Id.
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 314 (citing Lalim v. Williams Cnty., 105 N.W.2d 339 (N.D. 1960)).
Id. at 314–15.
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present case, the deeds are from private parties to a private party. 96
Additionally, it found that the deeds in the present case contain different
granting language from the deed in Lalim. 97
The Court instead relied on the specific granting language of the deeds to
determine the grantors’ intent.98 The language of six of the seven deeds
stated that the grantors “do hereby GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL and
CONVEY unto the said party of the second part, its successors and assigns,
a piece, parcel or tract of land.” 99 Specifically noting that “conveyances to
railroads that purport to grant and convey a strip, piece, parcel, or tract of
land, and do not contain additional language relating to the use or purpose
to which the land is to be put . . . are usually construed as passing an estate
in fee.” 100 The Court concluded these six deeds were unambiguous and
granted a fee simple estate.101
The Court then found the language of the seventh deed ambiguous,
stating, “Although the deed on its face conveys the property in fee simple,
the property description creates ambiguity about whether the parties
intended to convey a lesser estate.”102 Since there could be reasonable
differences of opinion regarding the inferences to be drawn from such
language, summary judgment was inappropriate. 103
Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and determined that six
deeds were unambiguous and conveyed a fee simple estate and judgment
should be entered in favor of Soo Line. 104 The Court further remanded the
case for trial on the seventh deed only, as it was ambiguous, and stated that
on remand the district court may consider extrinsic evidence to clarify the
parties’ intentions. 105
Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion and
Justice Sandstrom wrote a separate dissenting opinion. 106 Both opinions
argue that all of the deeds were ambiguous and that the entire case should
be remanded for trial.107
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 315.
Id.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 317 (quoting 65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads § 45 (2015)).
Id. at 321–22.
Id. at 322.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 323-24.
Id.
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6. Court Interprets Language Contained in Warranty Clause as a
Reservation of Mineral Interests in the Grantors: Johnson v. Shield.
In Johnson v. Shield, 108 the Supreme Court of North Dakota was asked to
interpret the language of deed. 109 At issue was whether specific language
contained in the warranty clause of a deed constituted a reservation of
mineral interest in the grantors. 110 On December 8, 1942, Eugenie and Roy
Goldenberg executed a warranty deed for a certain tract of land unto Julian
and Arthur Johnson. 111 At the time of the conveyance, the Goldenbergs
owned all of the minerals associated with the conveyed tract.112 While the
granting clause of the warranty deed did not address mineral interests, the
warranty clause provided that the Goldenbergs
covenant . . . that they are well seized in fee of land, real estate
and premises aforesaid, and have good right to sell and convey
the same in manner and form aforesaid; that the same are free
from all encumbrances, but reserving, however, to the grantor
fifty per cent (50%) of all of the oil, gas, hydro-carbons and
minerals in or with respect to said real property. 113
Eric A. Johnson and others (collectively “Johnson”), successors in
interest to Julian and Arthur Johnson, brought an action to quiet title
seeking a determination that the deed conveyed all of the minerals located
under the property conveyed. 114 On cross-motions for summary judgment,
however, the district court found that the deed unambiguously reserved
unto the Goldenbergs fifty percent of the minerals from their conveyance
and granted summary judgment in favor of Suzanne M. Shield and others
(collectively “Shield”), successors in interest to Eugenie and Roy
Goldenberg. 115
On appeal, Johnson, relying on the Court’s decision in Muller v.
Strangeland, 116 argued that the reservation language in the warranty clause
only constituted a limitation on the warranty, not a reservation of the

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

868 N.W.2d 368 (N.D. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 370.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 371 (citing Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D. 1983)).
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minerals. 117 In response, the Court acknowledged that exceptions inserted
in the warranty clauses are usually only intended to protect the grantor on
the warranty and not meant to be a limitation on the interest conveyed in the
granting clause. 118 The Court noted, however, that “reservations or
exceptions of property interest may appear in any part of a deed, including
the warranty clause.” 119 Focusing on the phrase, “reserving . . . to the
grantor,” the Court reasoned the phrase made no sense in the context of a
limitation on the warranty. 120 Therefore, the Court concluded that “the
disputed language here is so explicit as to leave no room for doubt that it
was intended to be a reservation of mineral interests in the Goldenbergs
rather than a limitation on the warranty.” 121
7. Disputed Issues of Material Fact Regarding Whether the Plaintiffs
Were Good Faith Purchasers for Value, Precluded Summary Judgment:
Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson
In Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson, 122 the Supreme Court of North
Dakota faced an issue revolving around an unrecorded deed. Sometime
before 1990, Elmer Benson conveyed a one-fifth share of mineral interests
in 160 acres to each of his named grandchildren, Edward Benson, John
Benson, Louise Benson, Geri Benson, and Ann Kemske. 123 In 1990, Ann
Kemske and her husband conveyed and quitclaimed, by deed, all right, title,
and interest in the 160 acres to Thomas Benson. 124 This deed was not
recorded until April 9, 2012. 125 On April 15, 2010, Ann Kemske conveyed,
by mineral deed, all right, title, and interest in minerals to 1,720 acres,
including the 160 acres in dispute, to Family Tree. 126 This deed was
recorded May 12, 2010. 127 Family Tree then conveyed twenty acres of the
160 acres to Desert Partners by deed dated May 12, 2010, and recorded
June 2, 2010. 128 Desert Partners and Family Tree brought an action to quiet

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 372.
Id.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 372 (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 372–73.
875 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 2016).
Id. at 511-12.
Id. at 512.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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title. 129 John Benson filed an answer, claiming, in part, that the disputed
interest had been conveyed unto him and his son, Ben Benson, by Thomas
Benson, and arguing that the Plaintiffs failed to make a reasonable and
diligent inquiry regarding the ownership of the disputed mineral
interests. 130 After its initial ruling of summary judgment was reversed and
remanded due to improper notice of the hearing, the district court again
granted summary judgment in favor of Desert Partners and Family Tree.131
On appeal, John Benson claimed that a statement of claim of mineral
interests was recorded in November 2005 stating Thomas Benson, Leatrice
Benson, Edward Benson, Louise Benson Kack, Geri Benson, and Ann
Kemske were the record owners of the disputed minerals.132 Accordingly,
he argued, that Plaintiffs were not good faith purchasers for value because
they should have inquired into the ownership of the minerals. 133 The Court
found that “[t]he statement of claim provides constructive notice on the
record about Ann Kemske's ownership and authority to convey the disputed
mineral interests in 2010, when she executed the mineral deed to Family
Tree.” 134 The Court further concluded that the statement of claim imposed a
duty on Family Tree to make further inquiries regarding the ownership of
the disputed mineral interests, and therefore Family Tree was deemed to
have constructive notice of the facts that an inquiry would have revealed. 135
Therefore, the Court, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as
to whether the Plaintiffs were good-faith purchasers for value, reversed the
motion for summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. 136
8. Court Holds that Language Contained in Land Manager’s Letter Did
Not Modify Lease: Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC.
In Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC, 137 the Supreme Court of
North Dakota affirmed a ruling against a top lessee, finding that the primary
lease had not expired and promissory estoppel was not applicable.138 On
May 4, 2007, Leroy and Norma Seaton executed an oil and gas lease unto

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
878 N.W.2d 397 (N.D. 2016).
Id.
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Gadeco, LLC (“Gadeco”) covering various sections of land.139 The lease
had a primary term of five years and contained a “continuing operations
clause” that allowed the primary term to be extended if no more than ninety
days elapsed between the completion or abandonment of one well and the
beginning of drilling operations of the subsequent well. 140 A well was spud
on the property on August 31, 2011. 141 On February 9, 2012, the Seatons
entered into a top lease with Valentina Exploration, LLC covering the same
section of land already under lease with Gadeco. 142 On March 5, 2012, a
land manager for Gadeco sent a letter to lessors stating that
[p]ursuant to the terms of your Oil and Gas lease with us, dated
May 4, 2007 . . . this fulfills our obligation to drill a well and
hold your lease acreage in Sections 5, 8, and 18 beyond its
primary term. As indicated by the lease, we are tendering a
payment of $230.02 which constitutes a shut-in royalty equal to
$1.00 per net acre. In addition, per the terms of your lease with
us, if no wells are spud prior to the lease expiration of May 4[,]
2012, then the acreage in Sections 6 and 7 will terminate.143
Subsequently, within fifty-five days after the primary term, Gadeco
completed wells on Sections 6 and 7. 144 Valentina Williston sued for
declaratory judgment and quiet title arguing, in part, that the due to the
effect of the land manager’s letter, the lease was terminated as a matter of
law and also that the letter invoked “the doctrine of estoppel.”145 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Gadeco.146
On appeal, the Court noted that the lease outlined specific duties if the
lessee were to surrender the lease but did not contain provisions on how the
parties could modify it. 147 The Court found that the letter did not meet the
requirement for surrender. 148 Then, relying on contract theories, the Court
stated that in order for Valentina Williston to succeed, it must show that the
letter was a written contract that modified the lease. 149 Upon review, the
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Court concluded that the letter did not modify the lease because there was
no offer or consideration. 150 Additionally, even if the letter contained an
offer, there was no acceptance.151
The Court also addressed Valentina Williston's argument regarding
promissory estoppel, finding that the letter did not contain “a clear, definite,
and unambiguous promise.” 152 Thus, the promissory estoppel was
inapplicable.153 The ruling of the district court was affirmed. 154
B. United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
1. Pugh Clause Interpreted to Divide Lease at Section Boundary:
Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Moen.
In Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Moen, 155 the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, applying North Dakota law, interpreted a Pugh
clause in favor of the lessee. 156 The lease in question, executed in 1984,
leased five sections of land (using the Public Land Survey System), for a
term of five years and “thereafter as long as oil and gas is [sic] produced
from said land or Lessee is engaged in drilling or reworking operations,
thereon.” 157 The lease also contained a Pugh clause which stated,
This lease shall terminate at the end of the primary term as to all
of the leased lands except those lands located within the same
section of a production unit[] or spacing unit prescribed by law
or administrative authority on which is located a well producing
or capable of [] producing oil or gas in commercial quantities.158
At the end of the primary term of the lease, Section 3 contained two
active wells and each was assigned a spacing unit.159 A spacing unit is an
administrative created boundary assigned by North Dakota Commission
“for drilling, producing and proration purposes,” which is used to prevent
waste, avoid unnecessary drilling, and protect correlative rights. 160 The first
150.
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well was assigned a 160 acre spacing unit comprised of the northwest
quarter of Section 3 and the second well was assigned a 160 acre spacing
unit comprised of the northeast quarter of Section 3. 161 The southwest
quarter, however, was not included within any spacing unit with an active
well. 162 The primary dispute was whether the Pugh clause divided the
lease at the spacing unit boundaries or the section boundaries. 163
Essentially, the issue was whether the entire section was held by production
anywhere on that section or, in the alternative, did the Pugh clause divide
the lease such that the lease expired at the end of the primary term as to all
land not contained in a spacing unit with an active well. 164 The district court
agreed with the Northern Oil and Limsco that the division line is the section
boundary, not the spacing boundary, and entered summary judgment in
their favor. 165
On appeal, the Court considered the specific language of the Pugh
clause, as well as the parties’ interpretations regarding the meaning of the
phrase “the same section of.” 166 Noting that neither side proposed an
interpretation that gave meaning to both of the disputed terms “section” and
“of,” the Court found Northern Oil and Limsco’s interpretation to be more
persuasive and less damaging to the plain language of the Pugh clause. 167
Therefore, the Court adopted the interpretation of Northern Oil and Limsco
such that the Pugh clause divided the lease at the section boundaries and
affirmed the summary judgment granted by the district court.168
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